

# A Model-Checking Approach to Safe SFCs

Ralf Huuck

School of Computer Science & Engineering, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia

Ben Lukoschus

Department of Computer Science, University of Kiel, Germany

Nanette Bauer

BASF AG, Ludwigshafen, Germany

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
- Sequential Function Charts (SFCs)
- “Unsafe” and “unreachable” SFCs
- Definition of “safe” SFCs
- Algorithmic checking for “safe” SFCs:
  - Execution model for SFCs
  - Formal specification of “safe”
  - Model checking
- Summary, future work

# Sequential Function Charts (SFCs)

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- Graphical programming language for PLCs
- Based on Petri nets and Grafcet
- Syntax and informal semantics defined in IEC 61131-3
- Concepts:
  - Actions (embedding of other PLC languages)
  - Parallelism
  - Hierarchy


# Sequential Function Charts: Components




# Sequential Function Charts: Transition Types




$(\{s_1\}, g, \{s_2\})$



$(\{s_1\}, g, \{s_2, s_3, s_4\})$




$(\{s_1, s_2, s_3\}, g, \{s_4\})$



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
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


$(\{s_1, s_2, s_3\}, g, \{s_4, s_5\})$


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


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





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


# “Unsafe” and “unreachable” SFCs



IEC 61131-3 calls these SFCs “unsafe” / “unreachable” ...

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But construction still possible in many programming environments!

“Safe” = absence of “unsafe” and “unreachable”

## Informal (graphical):

- no jumps between parallel branches
- no jumps out of parallel branches
- every opening parallel branch is closed correctly

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- no jumps between parallel branches
- no jumps out of parallel branches
- every opening parallel branch is closed correctly

## Formal (Petri net execution model):

- In each execution there is at most one token in each step.
- For every closing parallel transition there is an execution that uses this transition.

# Check for “Safe” SFCs = Reachability Problem

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## “Safe” as reachability:

1. No state can be reached in which more than one token can enter a step.
2. For every closing parallel transition a state is reachable in which this transition can be used.

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## ⇒ **Checking by model checking (Cadence SMV):**

- Abstraction of SFCs
- Modelling of SFC executions in CaSMV
- Definition of “safe” in CaSMV



# CaSMV model for SFCs: Variables

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## Abstraction of the token flow:

- no program variables
- no actions
- guards are replaced by unconstrained Boolean variables
- one Boolean variable  $s_i$  for each step  
( $s_i = true$ : step  $s_i$  has a token)

## State changes of the variables:

- discrete transition system
- relation “next” between old and new values

# CaSMV model for SFCs: Transitions

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Activity of step  $s_i$  in the next cycle:

$$\text{next}(s_i) \equiv s_i\_will\_be\_entered \vee (s_i \wedge s_i\_will\_not\_be\_left)$$

# CaSMV model for SFCs: Transitions


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$$s_i\_will\_be\_entered \equiv$$

$$(\exists t = (S, g, T) \in Tr : s_i \in T \wedge \text{next}(g) \wedge \bigwedge_{s_j \in S} s_j$$



$$\wedge \forall t' = (S, g', T') \in Tr \setminus \{t\} : \text{next}(g') \Rightarrow \bigwedge_{s_k \in T' \setminus T} \neg \text{next}(s_k))$$

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
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Step  $s_i$  will not be left in the next cycle:

$$s_i\_will\_not\_be\_left \equiv \neg \exists (S, g, T) \in Tr : s_i \in S \wedge \text{next}(g) \wedge \bigwedge_{s_j \in S} s_j$$

# Requirement 1: At most one token in a step



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More than one token in a step:

$$\text{next}(\text{token\_overflow}) \equiv \bigvee_{s_i \in St} ($$

$$(s_i \wedge \bigvee_{\substack{(S,g,T) \in Tr \\ S \neq T}} (s_i \in T \wedge \text{next}(g) \wedge \bigwedge_{s_j \in S} s_j))$$

$$\bigvee ( \bigvee_{\substack{(S_1,g_1,T_1) \in Tr \\ (S_2,g_2,T_2) \in Tr \\ S_1 \cap S_2 = \emptyset}} (s_i \in T_1 \cap T_2 \wedge \text{next}(g_1) \wedge \text{next}(g_2) \wedge \bigwedge_{s_j \in S_1 \cup S_2} s_j) ) )$$




**CaSMV specification:** SPEC AG !token\_overflow

## Requirement 2: Closing parallel transitions

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We show for each transition  $(S, g, T) \in Tr$  with  $|S| > 1$ :  
There exists an execution in which all  $s_i \in S$  are active.

**CaSMV specification:** SPEC EF  $\&_{s_i \in S} S_i$



## Implemented as a tool:

- Input: SFC in IEC 61131-3 or Siemens syntax
- Output: CaSMV code and CTL specification

## Output of CaSMV:

- **OK** – SFC is “safe”
- **Error trace** (helpful to locate the problem)

⇒ requires only minimal interaction by the user

# Summary and Future Work

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## Summary

- The problem of “unsafe” and “unreachable” SFCs
- Algorithmic approach to check for “safe” SFCs:
  - abstract CaSMV model
  - tool-supported automatic verification

## Future work

- Embed tool into PLC programming environments
- Combine with other automated verification approaches, e.g., static analysis